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In the last four decades, macroeconomic modelling practices underwent 
a deep transformation. My dissertation provides a history of this 
transformation, starting from Robert E. Lucas’s work in the 1970s up to 
today’s dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) approach (Smets 
and Wouters, 2003). Working from a historical perspective, I suggest 
that the recent rise of DSGE models should be characterized as a shaky 
compromise between opposing views of modelling methodology—on the 
one hand, the real business cycle (RBC) view, on the other hand, the new 
Keynesian view. To justify this claim, my work provides an 
epistemological reconstruction of the recent history of macroeconomics, 
building from an analysis of the criteria defining the validity and the 
pertinence of a model. 
My assumption is that recent macroeconomic modelling practices 
can be described by three distinctive methodological criteria: 1) the 
internal validity criterion (which establishes the consistency between 
models’ assumptions and concepts and formalisms of a theory), 2) the 
external validity criterion (which establishes the consistency between 
the assumptions and results of a model and the real world, as well as 
the quantitative methods needed to assess such a consistency), and 3) 
the “hierarchization” criterion (which establishes the preference for 
internal over external validity, or vice versa). This epistemological 
analysis draws primarily from the literature about models in philosophy 
of science (especially Morgan and Morrison 1999). 
My work aims to make four contributions to the history of recent 
macroeconomics. Firstly, to account for the rise of DSGE models without 
referring to the explanation provided by the macroeconomists 
                                                
1 Original title (the dissertation is in French): "De la révolution lucasienne aux modèles 
DSGE. Réflexions sur les développements récents de la modélisation 
macroéconomique". 
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themselves, who tend to think that macroeconomics evolved through 
theoretical consensus and exogenous technical progress. By distancing 
itself from this perspective, my work draws attention to the disruptive 
character of methodological controversies and to the interdependence 
between theoretical activity and the development of statistical and 
econometric methods. Secondly, to overcome the existing divide 
between the history of macroeconomic theories (such as De Vroey, 2015) 
and the history of quantitative methods. Through its epistemological 
perspective, my work reconciles these two historiographies and specifies 
the basis for a comprehensive understanding of recent developments in 
macroeconomics. Thirdly, to put the accent on the external validity 
condition as the main controversial issue separating different views of 
macro-modelling methodology. Furthermore, I illustrate how the debate 
about external validity is closely related to the problem of causal 
explanation (such as recently discussed in Maki 2005 and Reiss 2012) 
and to the conditions for providing economic policy evaluation. 
Fourthly, to characterize the DSGE approach: although DSGE models are 
often presented as a “synthesis”, or as a “consensus”, they are better 
described as a shaky compromise between two opposing methodological 
visions. 
Part I of the dissertation analyses Lucas’s methodological view. 
Relying both on his published works (from the 1970s until today) and 
on archival material (correspondence, drafts), I emphasize the 
ambivalence of Lucas’ vision of models, which suggest two incompatible 
definitions of external validity: on the one hand, ‘black box’ models, 
characterized by a-realistic assumptions; on the other hand, models as 
‘laboratories’ for policy analysis, relying on causal analogies. 
Furthermore, I discuss how Lucas’s view was implemented during the 
1970s by the new classical macroeconometric research program (Lucas 
and Sargent 1981), and emphasize the shortcomings of this approach in 
terms of methods and results. 
Part II of the dissertation illustrates the competing views on models 
developed by RBC (Kydland and Prescott 1982) and new Keynesians 
(Mankiw and Romer 1991) during the 1980s and early 1990s. RBC 
modellers embraced Lucas’s 'black box view’ of models, emphasizing a-
realistic assumptions. As a result, they departed substantially from new 
classical economics by abandoning econometric methods and 
championing calibration. In contrast, new Keynesian economics 
SERGI / PHD THESIS SUMMARY 
VOLUME 10, ISSUE 1, SPRING 2017 144 
emphasized the need for ‘realistic’ assumptions as an alternative to the 
RBC ‘black box’ models. 
Part III of the dissertation analyses two debates, which illustrate the 
shift from the open conflict between RBC and new Keynesian views to a 
compromise—the DSGE approach—embodying these tensions. First, the 
famous Prescott (1986a, 1986b) and Summers (1986) controversy is 
reinterpreted within my methodological criteria to illustrate how 
methodological views on modelling were the underlying crucial issue of 
this debate. Inside the current DSGE approach, these two interpretations 
are still in conflict, as shown by the recent literature. In the final chapter 
of the dissertation, the on-going discussions on the vulnerability of 
DSGE models to the Lucas critique are shown to be a crucial example of 
this tension. I argue that two competing interpretations of the Lucas 
critique arose from opposing views on modelling methodology: whereas 
RBC conceived the Lucas critique as a theoretical proposition, pertaining 
to the internal validity criteria, new Keynesians rather interpreted the 
Lucas critique as an empirical proposition, pertaining to the external 
validity set of conditions. Today’s DSGE modellers inherited these 
competing interpretations. Moreover, these competing interpretations 
result in alternative research paths that tend to destabilise the 
compromise about DSGE models. 
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